3rd Brigade Combat Team
Detainee Cage Operations
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM
AGENDA

Overview

Detainee Holding Facility Operations

- Detainee Procedures
- Tactical HUMINT Team SOP
- Military Police Holding Facility SOP
- Example Detainee Packets

Lessons Learned

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AO RAKKASAN

273 Km of Syrian Border
17 Km of Turkish Border
22 Manned Border Forts
2 x Authorized Border Crossings
- Rabiah (Iraq-Syria)
- Harbor Gate (Iraq-Turkey)
125 Km of Oil Pipeline
20,000(+) Km² of Zone
Detainee Flow

Procedures
- MP/Medical in-processing
- CI/HUMINT Screening Report
- CIIR Generated
- HUMINT TM Recommendation
- OMT Recommendation
- BCT Staff Recommendation Memo

101st ABN DIV (AASLT) Detainee Holding Facility

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Tainee Holding Facility Layout

BCT Detention Facility

1. Brent wall
2. Lamp
3. Interrogation Tent
4. Main Cage Living Area
5. Triple strand concertina wire
6. Guard tower
7. Triple strand concertina wire
8. Brent wall
9. Opening on the Brent
10. Brent wall
11. Brent wall
12. Brent wall

Needs to build the cage:
- 2 rolls of concertina wire to connect the cages
- GP small light inside of the GP small
- for night interrogation

Needs for housing detainees:
- Mattresses
- Wood floor
- Wool blankets

Latrine
Questioning Tent
Guard Tower
HUMINT TEAM SOP

27 July 2003

A capturing unit has numerous requirements to ensure that

All Provisional Forces Apprehension Form

ed out ensuring all sections in yellow are complete. The

This area is critical so it allows for precise questioning of

2003 (Sworn Statement) from the soldiers who detained

of the captives/apprehension and the persons involved.

The details of the reasons for the capture and the capture

A capturing unit will interview the detainees’ items and

te report. This is only if the unit has a THT present

in IEPW Capture Tag (DD2446). This tag must be

noted with the detainee to the Brigade Cage. The Brigade

use documents are not filled out completely, neatly and

severely bandaged over their eyes and within covered

of where they are and to prevent return from

This is both to and from the Brigade Cage. All detainees

into the Cage, the Cage will notify both Assuan TOC

not Team (ACT)[581-3111]. The ACT will then

new team (OMT) to send a Tactical HUMINT Team

e that was not done previously.

d-off the CPPAF and DA 2823. The THT will then

ed to the Division Cage (Grid LF338710). The THT will

it to the Brigade Cage. The paperwork at this time will

a. CPPAF

b. DA 2823

c. Screening report

d. DA 4171 of the detainee’s items

e. EFW Capture Tag (DD2446)

The THT will inspect all the paperwork at that time, ensuring that all the necessary items

are present to get the detainees into the Division Cage

5. Upon verification of the paperwork being complete by the THT:

a. The Brigade Cage will notify Assuan TOC that the detainee has the proper

paperwork and are able to be transferred.

b. Assuan TOC will coordinate to have the detainee sent to the Division Cage.

Assuan TOC will notify the Division Cage (581-0972), attention MSG Roberts or MSG Bratley,

that there are detainees on route. They will provide the number, gender, and type of detainees to

other MSG. If an aircraft arrives for the detainees, the Division Cage MPs must be called and

asked to meet the aircraft to transport the detainees.

c. The THT will call the CI Cage (581-9511), and relay their reports to the Cage to allow

them time to prepare for the transportation. This ensures that the HPA’s running the cage and the

interrogation within the cage are prepared for the detainees’ arrival.

6. Detainees will be delivered to the Division Cage, using a one guard per three detainees.

Unless it involves an aircraft transfer, then the ratio will be one guard per two detainees. A

Mission Complete Report will be submitted to RAK TOC when the delivery mission is

complete.

7. Detainees who are screened at the Brigade Cage and are without intelligence value will be

recommended to RAK 2 for release. RAK 2 will relay that recommendation, along with his

recommendation, and present it to RAK 3 or RAK 5 for approval/disapproval. If approved,

RAK TOC will notify Assuan TOC. The capturing unit will also be notified and be directed

to return the detainee to the point of capture.

8. The point of contact for this is CPT [REDACTED] 581-0972. 

CPT, MII

Commanding
MP PLATOON SOP

20 September 2004

STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE

MP PLATOON

NEW YORK NATIONAL GUARD

TENTH REGIMENT, 283RD INFANTRY

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I. INTRODUCTION

The New York National Guard is responsible for providing security and support to the New York City Police Department during large-scale events, such as the New York City Marathon. The MP Platoon is responsible for ensuring the safety and security of these events.

II. SCOPE

This SOP outlines the procedures for MP Platoon members during large-scale events. It covers all aspects of the MP Platoon's role, from planning to execution.

III. PROCEDURES

A. Planning

1. The MP Platoon must coordinate with the New York City Police Department to ensure that all security measures are in place.

2. The MP Platoon must ensure that all personnel are properly trained and equipped for the event.

B. Execution

1. Upon arrival at the event site, the MP Platoon must set up perimeter security and maintain a watchful eye on all activity.

2. The MP Platoon must be ready to respond to any incidents that may occur.

C. Post-Event

1. The MP Platoon must debrief and document all incidents that occurred during the event.

2. The MP Platoon must ensure that all equipment is accounted for and stored properly.

IV. APPENDIX

A. MP Platoon SOP

B. MP Platoon Training

C. MP Platoon Equipment

V. CONCLUSION

The MP Platoon is an essential part of ensuring the safety and security of large-scale events in New York City. By following these procedures, the MP Platoon can effectively maintain order and ensure the safety of all participants.
MP PLATOON SOP

This facility is designed to hold detainees for approximately one week. If a detainee remains in the BCP for up to 5 days, he will receive a shower under the supervision of a guard in the facility provided for them. A wash station is also provided within the living area of the BCP.

Vulture CP will call 5IC TIC with a detainee report at 1500 daily with the number of detainees, projected departure time, and any special situations.

The POC for this memorandum is the undersigned at Vulture CP.

LT, MP
Platoon Leader

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**TAKNEE SCREENING SHEET**

**Individual:**

- **Name:**
- **DOB:**
- **POB:**
- **Marital Status:**
- **Nationality:**
- **Religion:**
- **Ethnicity:**
- **Political Affiliation:**
- **Current Political Activity:**

**Detained by:**

- **Date of Detention:**
- **Reason for Detention:**

**Description:**

- **Physical Description:**
- **Other Information:**

**Detained at:**

- **Location:**
- **Interrogation:**

**Notes:**

- **Remarks:**
- **Transcription Notes:**

**Interrogation:**

- **Questions:**
- **Answers:**

**Additional Information:**

- **Observations:**
- **Follow-up Actions:**

**Conclusion:**

- **Recommendations:**
- **Follow-up Measures:**

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**FOUO**

**Training Use Only**

**FORMATION REPORT**

**User and Record Management**

CIR 10-311-0028-31-30
Syria Intelligence Service
Collecting against Coalition Forces
CIR 10-311-0028-0010

**FOUO (For Training Only)**

**REL TO UC**

**TNT 38**

**UC**

**Theater**

Al-Arabi

**2003122123239**

**2003122451430**

**Civil Intelligence Human**

**Report Details**

- Syrian Intelligence Service Collecting
- **FOUO**
  - **Training Use Only**

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**FOUO**

*(For Training Use Only)*

**CIR Summary**

Syrian intelligence and security forces are collecting intelligence about Coalition Forces by conducting human collection from local citizens detailed in Syria.

**Categories of People**

**Requirement/Priority Rating**

**Target**

**Person**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Middle Name</th>
<th>Phone</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Family**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Organizational Name**

**Organization Type**

**Defense**

Syria Intelligence Service

**Foreign Government Intelligence Service**

**Syria Intelligence Services Collecting Intel on US Forces**

**Using the Syrian border guard as a front**

**Location**

- [Blank]

**Individual Source**

- Yes

**Reliability of Source**

- 6 - Reliability cannot be judged

**Source ID Number**

- [Blank]

**Information Reliability**

- 6 - Truth cannot be judged

**Information Date (YYYYMMDD)**

- 20030321

**Last Date of Acquisition (YYYYMMDD)**

- 20030323

**Report**

On approximately 23 August 2003, an individual was detained by Syrian security forces in Homs (Greek 37F A.C43M 14X) and questioned regarding Coalition Forces. The individual does not remember the exact date of the incident. It is not known if the 23rd of August because the

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FOUO (For Training Use Only)

The suspect was arrested in Syria and later transferred to Iraq. He was accused of assisting intelligence officers in the region. The source described the suspect as being a former member of the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) and was involved in intelligence activities in Syria. The source indicated that the suspect had been in contact with the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) through his previous affiliation with the service.

Source: Foreign Intelligence Source

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Offense against Coalition Forces [check one] If "Other" then describe:

- Violation of Curfew
- Illegal Possession of Weapon
- Assault/Attack on Coalition Forces
- Theft of Coalition Force Property

Apprehending Unit: Location Grid:

Date of Incident: (D/M/Y) Time of Incident: Date of Report: (D/M/Y) Time of Report:

Detainee # Key Connected Person: ☐ Victim ☐ Witness

Last Name: First Name: Given Name:

Hair Color: Scars/Tattoos/Deformities: Hair Color: Scars/Tattoos/Deformities:

Eye-Color: Weight: lb Height: in Eye-Color: Weight: lb Height: in

Address:

Place of Birth:

Ethn/Tribal/Sect: Sex: Phone#: DOC D/M/Y: ☐ Mobile ☐ Regular

Document #:

Total Number of Persons Involved (list names/identifying info on reverse under "Additional Helpful Information")

Vehicle Information Vehicle Number ____ of ____ Vehicle(s) Owner:

Make: Color: VIN:

Model: Type: Plate No.: Number of People in Vehicle:

Year: Names of People in Vehicle:

Contraband/Weapons in Vehicle:

Property/Contraband ☐ Weapon ☐ Photo Taken of Suspect with Weapon/Contraband: Yes/ No

Type: Model: Color/Caliber:

Serial No.: Quantity: Make: Receipt Provided to Owner: Yes/ No

Other Details: Where Found: Owner:

Name of Assisting Interpreter: Email, Phone, or Contact info:

Detaining Soldier's Name (Print): Signature:

Supervising Officer’s Name (Print): Signature:

Email: Unit Phone: Date: / /

Unit Phone: Date: / /
How was this person traveling (car, bus, on foot)?

Who was with this person?

What weapons was this person carrying?

What contraband was this person carrying?

What other weapons were seized?

What other information did you get from this person?

Additional Helpful Information:
12 NOV 03

Ex 6

or Detainee

allowing detainee detained by B/2-187th on 11

Saba Wahabi

Elements from 2-187th INF for firing at a US convoy that he fired a shot at a would-be thief, not at a local police man who is authorized to carry a

US forces did not return fire. Detainee is lying dead by Radio2, US forces did return fire
to be released

Garrel-Patton, CI/HUMINT section, 501

CVG, USA
CI Tech, OMT
TTPs & Lessons Learned

Determining Truth from Fiction

ON: Personal Vendettas against different ethnic groups caused influx of bogus reporting from interrogators and S2’s created litmus test before acting on reports. However, once you found someone giving info on their own clan/ethnic group (Kurd on Kurd or Arab on Arab), report by itself held more weight.

ENDATION: Tactical patience is critical when taking detain host nation personnel during SASO. It’s more of a Science, and usually learned after the unit makes mistakes.
TTPs & Lessons Learned

Tracking of detainees

1. Detainees lost in the system due to number/misspelling
2. Arabic Names
3. Racking Detainees above division and retrieving interrogation
4. Retrieving of detainees was very difficult
5. No routine system for the Iraqi public to contact detainees or
   status of loved one within the system

IDATION:
1. PW Tag number is the sole tracking device (needs to be
   mated down to platoon level)
2. Database management within the AOR
3. Use EPW Tag (portion C) as a hand receipt for family
   numbers. Provide local police with roll up of detainees. Citizens
   card to police and receive detainee status. Facilitate
   communication through red crescent/red cross mailbox at the
   police station
4. Clarification of detainee tracking responsibilities across the
   (is the S1 the right choice by doctrine?)
TTPs & Lessons Learned

Operation and liaison with local law enforcement agencies.

ION:
Releasing detainees of no intelligence value to authorities for repatriation empowers local government. Criminals turned over to local authorities and detained in facilities which are reserved for anti-personnel. Police should have visibility on where detained citizens are within the system.

ENDATION: Keep strong positive relationships with civic leadership. Avoid empowering tribal Sheiks and keep them the information directly.
TTPs & Lessons Learned

Detainee review/release procedures at BDE level.

ON: 3BCT’s review process prevented any incarcerations and inadvertent release of intelligence value. At times a detainee from one sector affected working relationships with host nation in other sectors within the 3BCT and or Division review process enhanced the BDE Cdr’s ability to maintain order throughout the AO.

ENDATION: Processing detainees for release or to higher should be a green tab decision with staff evaluation.
TTPs & Lessons Learned

PR Net Access to Battalion Level Units.

IN: Once Secret network was established at (non doctrinal) detainee operations were more efficient. Ability to pass intelligence traffic and questions to the interrogators increased and decreased amount of time a detainee spent at

ENDATION: Establish a Secret “digital bridge” to or both Operations and Intelligence traffic.
QUESTIONS

The Classification Level of this Briefing is:
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